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Abstract Bruno S. Frey suggests nine Proposals to refine future democratic pro-
cesses. This paper unifies subsets of Frey’s Proposals. In doing so, certain Proposals
are further supported while others are challenged. In addition, I suggest that our
increased global reliance as well as advances in technology should force further
changes to our democratic institutions.
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1 Introduction
Aristotle suggested that a citizen’s individual liberty is intrinsically tied to their
participation in political life. In his day, Aristotle was tasked with promoting
participation and civic virtue within small populations of homogeneous people. As
our populations have become increasingly heterogeneous and our republican
thought has turned democratic, the task of promoting citizenry has become even
more daunting (Sandel 1998). A natural line of inquiry is to investigate revisions to
democracy that would align our institutions with the evolved responsibility of
modern citizens. The essay by Frey (2017) provides nine concrete Proposals aimed
at this task. The contribution of this paper, here, is twofold. First, this paper unifies
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subsets of Frey’s Proposals using different underlying themes. I am enthusiastic
about Frey’s venture and I agree with much of Frey’s composition and subsequent
nine Proposals. However, in an effort to further advance Frey’s original work, I
largely reserve attention towards critical aspects of the nine Proposals. The second
section proposes new challenges for the future of democracy based on advances in
technology and our increased global reliance.
2 Frey’s Proposals
2.1 Purpose-Driven Democracy
Democratic processes are used to aggregate individual preferences into a group
decision. This external property is useful in a broad range of applications from
electing people into the most powerful positions in the world to electing a
suitable establishment for a group lunch. There are many refinements that a
democratic process can include and Frey illustrates particularly novel suggestions
with his nine Proposals. When considering refinements for modern-day and future
democratic processes, we can apply a teleological approach which, maybe
coincidently, is a tool as old as democracy itself.1 The inclusion of any democratic
refinement should be contingent on its alignment with the intrinsic purpose, or
‘‘telos’’, of that democratic process. Frey suggests that democracy can be extended
to non-political spheres, such as within incorporated companies. However, different
companies serve different purposes and the level of democracy can flexibly align
with the unique purpose of each company. For instance, if the purpose of the
company is to endow power equally across all workers, regardless of their position,
experience, or stock holdings, then voting rights should be equally spread across all
workers. A different company could champion the purpose of granting power to
those in proportion to their monetary holding in the company. The latter would
endow voting rights proportional to the number of stocks held.2 An extreme case
would be a company whose purpose is to endow power to the individual with the
most amount of monetary earnings to lose, which would lead to a dictatorship. With
the case of incorporated companies, different purposes dictate different levels of
democracy. More generally, the intrinsic purpose of any group decision will dictate
whether it is appropriate to introduce democratic ideals. In this way, teleological
thinking can serve as a guideline for Proposals 6.1 and 6.2. Whether a political
(Prop 6.2) or non-political (Prop 6.1) organization adopts a democratic platform will
depend on the purpose of the organization.
Proposals 6.3 and 6.4 offer novel ways to progressively increase or decrease an
individual’s voting weight based on the amount of time they reside within a
country’s borders. In these Proposals, foreigners will gain a percentage of a vote for
every year they live within a country and nationals living abroad will lose a
1 Teleological thinking is largely credited to Plato and Aristotle (Barker 1958).
2 However, an analysis using power indices shows that this approach hardly ever guarantees
proportionality of power (Holler and Nurmi 2013).
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percentage of their vote for every year they live outside a county. It seems clear that
endowing proportional voting rights is a more desirable method than an all-or-
nothing policy based on a country’s classification of citizenship. However, a
teleological criticism can be raised against these Proposals. Is the purpose of these
democracies to reward those who have resided the most amount of years within the
physical boarders of that society? Proposals 6.3 and 6.4 can be improved upon by
endowed voting power proportional to a more meaningful measure of involvement
in society. For example, individuals who are more affected by the outcome of the
vote should have a higher voting power. Proposal 6.5, which splits an individual’s
voting power based on where they live and where they work, clearly illustrates that
Frey anticipates a teleological approach. While this Proposal only applies to
individuals who commute to work, it is attractive because it can be immediately
implemented. A future challenge is to find other meaningful and measurable factors
that can be used to allocate proportional voting power.
2.2 Important Social Change
Suggesting that older voters have greater power in constitutional reform (Proposal
6.6) relies on a ‘‘mechanism design’’ argument that disconnects the voters (elderly)
from the consequences of the vote (disproportionately the young). In this way, direct
personal interest is somewhat removed from the voting process which may lead to
more socially beneficial choices. However, endowing any group with a dispropor-
tionate amount of voting power will also serve to disproportionately propagate that
group’s beliefs. In the case of the elderly, empirical evidence suggests that
endowing them with a disproportionate amount of voting power could disrupt the
progression of human rights. As an example, consider the modern debate over the
legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States. A Pew research poll ‘‘5 facts
about same-sex marriage 2015’’ conducted yearly from 2005 to 2015 compared the
support for legalizing same-sex marriage across four different generations: the
Silent generation (born between 1928 and 1945), Baby Boomers (born between
1946 and 1964), Gen X (born between 1965 and 1980), and Millennials (born after
1980). The overall trend is that all generations are becoming more supportive of
same-sex marriage. However, the percentage of supporters within each generation
was always negatively related to age. For each of the 11 years of polling,
Millennials supported same-sex marriage more than Gen Xers who supported it
more than Baby Boomers who supported it more than the Silent generation. In the
case of same-sex marriage laws in the US, endowing older voters with additional
power for constitutional reform would almost certainly have a negative effect on
social progress.
As motivated by Frey, a natural concern with close majority victories is the
‘‘undemocratic’’ sentiment that a small number of voters are pivotal in deciding an
issue that affects the entire society. Instead of requiring a super-majority, Proposal
6.7 suggests a second-stage of negotiation dependent on the margin of victory. This
Proposal states that ‘‘[t]he narrower the outcome of a vote is, the more strongly must
the representatives of the two opposing camps engage in a formalized, constitu-
tionally sanctioned procedure in which a solution agreeable to both sides is to be
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reached’’ (Frey 2017). However, there is empirical evidence suggesting that such a
refinement could hinder social progress. A notorious example is the vote to adopt
the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which essentially outlawed
slavery (Vorenberg 2001). If 3 of the 175 voters within the US House of
Representatives changed their votes from ‘‘yea’’ to ‘‘nay’’, the Amendment would
not have passed. If the voting system of 1865 implemented a revision reflecting
Proposal 6.7, it seems plausible that the practice of owning slaves would not have
been so decisively criminalized.3
Proposals 6.6 and 6.7 are susceptible to the same criticism that Frey leverages
towards requiring a super-majority: ‘‘The society risks getting increasingly
conservative and fossilized’’. There is little doubt that, regardless of the democratic
system, the American electorate would have eventually outlawed slavery. The same
could be said for the eventual acceptance of same-sex marriage. The enlightenment
of an electorate’s morality with respect to important social progress is bound to
outweigh any reasonable democratic procedure. However, proposals that endow
disproportionate weight to the elderly or require deliberation for close victories can
slow such progress.
2.3 Preference for Randomness
Proposal 6.8 is most easily motivated with Frey’s example of an electorate choosing
whether to build a bridge. If 60% of the citizens vote to build the bridge and 40%
vote to not build it, then the decision will ultimately be made by a randomized
mechanism where the probability that a bridge is erected is 60% (possibly by
drawing a ball from an urn with 60 green balls and 40 red balls). Proposal 6.9 uses a
similar approach to randomly draw political positions from an underlying
population. Frey makes a compelling case for these two Proposals in the section
focused on a ‘‘True Democracy by Random Decisions’’. In addition to the benefits
discussed in Frey, humans have been shown to prefer random mechanism in some
environments. For instance, humans prefer a level of randomness when allocating
an indivisible good. In Machina’s intuitive ‘‘Parental Example’’ (Machina 1989), a
mother needs allocate an indivisible ‘‘treat’’ to one of her two children. In this case,
the mother would prefer a coin flip to determine the outcome rather than endowing
either child with treat for sure. Further research has equated a preference for
randomness with a preference for fairness (Bolton et al. 2005). Indeed, experimental
research has shown environments where subjects prefer randomized mechanisms
(Walker et al. 2000; Bolton et al. 2005; Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010; Borah 2013;
Dwenger et al. 2013; Agranov and Ortoleva 2017). Even purely mathematical
models of human behavior suggest scenarios where utility is maximized with the
choice of a random procedure as opposed to a deterministic one (Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. 2015). In addition, hostility across party lines would likely decrease if
unfavorable election outcomes were perceived as ‘‘bad luck’’ rather than ‘‘losing’’ to
an opponent.
3 As side note, multi-stage voting rules are more susceptible to strategic behavior as well as other
undesirable properties (Saari 2003). These results reflect negatively on Proposal 6.7.
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There are very strong arguments for the introduction of Proposals 6.8 and 6.9.
However, electorates may feel uncomfortable with using a process that could select
a fringe decision, however unlikely. To address this concern, a rule could state that
randomization will only be used when the electorate is closely divided. For instance,
the rule could be that randomization will only be used if a 2/3 majority is not
reached. In this case, election results with less than 2/3 of agreement will result in
randomization proportional to the voting outcome. If the 2/3 majority threshold is
reached, the majority decision will be implemented with certainty.
Another daunting task is to convince an electorate of the legitimacy of using a
randomization mechanism in democratic processes. This concern places importance
on the explicit motivation behind the mechanism. Consider one such motivation. A
group of five wants to have lunch together and they need to choose from two
different locations—one that primarily serves pizza and one that primarily serves
salad. Each individual knows their preference and suppose that three people prefer
pizza and two prefer salad. If the rule is that each person is able to choose the
restaurant at each of the 5 different days of the workweek, then the group will go for
pizza on 3 days and salad twice. From the week-long perspective, most people will
consider this ‘‘alternating dictator’’ as a fair method. What is the analogous
extension of this example if one of the five members can only show up for lunch on
one of the 5 days? The natural answer is that this person would have a 60% chance
of going for pizza and a 40% chance of going for salad. In this motivation, the
legitimacy of the week-long perspective should extend to the individual-day
perspective.
2.4 Importance of Individual Votes
A positive externality that runs across Proposals 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 is the increased
importance placed on individual votes. Most elections are not determined by a small
number of votes and even fewer are determined by a single vote. If a citizen is only
motivated to change the election outcome, it can be considered rational to abstain
from voting with even the smallest cost borne by casting a vote (Downs 1957). As
the number of voters increase, the probability that an individual vote will be pivotal
goes to zero. Proposals 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 mitigate this well-known problem by
including the margin of victory as a function of the election outcome. Since every
vote affects the margin of victory, every vote is pivotal. If every vote is pivotal,
‘‘rational’’ citizens are more likely to vote. As a natural side effect, citizens will be
encouraged to become more informed and to form opinions on issues that they
would otherwise ignore. Cultivating well-informed and highly active citizens is
arguably the greatest challenge faced by a democracy, at any time in history.
Proposal 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 should be championed for addressing this challenge.
Homo Oecon
123
3 Future Challenges for Democracy
3.1 Technology
The percentage of Americans using at least one social media website (65%) is
greater than the percentage of Americans who voted in the 2016 presidential
election (60.2%).4 Technological advances can be harnessed in order to enhance
future democratic processes. For instance, mobile technology can provide a voting
platform that could eliminate the need for voters to cast their votes at specific
physical locations. This would increase voter accessibility and reduce voter costs,
which will almost certainly increase voter turnout. In addition, technology can be
used to collect and count votes which could decrease human error associated with
the tasks. In 2005, Estonia was the first country to offer its citizens the option to vote
on the Internet (‘‘I-voting’’) in national elections. In the 2014 and 2015
parliamentary election, approximately 30% of the Estonian votes were cast through
the Internet. However, the Estonian I-voting system has been shown to have
significant security concerns. Independent researchers concluded that a sophisti-
cated attacker could ‘‘manipulate election outcomes’’ or at the very least ‘‘disrupt
the voting process or cast doubt on the legitimacy of results’’ (Springall et al. 2014).
Similar security concerns were discovered in the New South Wales iVote system
which accounted for 280,000 total votes in a state election in March 2015
(Halderman and Teague 2015). While some countries are increasing the use of
Internet or online voting (Finland, India, Lithuania, and Switzerland) others are
pulling back on its use based on security concerns (France and the Netherlands). It
seems likely that, as security concerns are reduced, more systems will incorporate
voting procedures that don’t require a physical presence.
Voting that does not require a physical presence can greatly empower the average
voter. Recent empirical work has shown that policy outcomes in the United States
are influenced by the alignment of interest groups and the preferences of the
economic elite while ‘‘the preferences of the average American appear to have only
a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy’’
(Gilens and Page 2014). One possible explanation for this result is that interest
groups and elites have a continual and direct influence on the political process while
average voters only vote for representatives once every few years. Technology and
social networks can provide a platform where the average voter can choose to have
a level of direct democracy that is comparable to the interest groups and elite. Such
a platform would enable everyone to directly vote on policies, rather than just voting
for representatives who serve as middle-men. Ideally, the platform could support a
‘‘liquid’’ democracy where citizens flow back and forth between indirect and direct
democracy. Voters can choose to use a representative on some policy matters while
choosing to directly vote on other matters. While seemingly outlandish, this idea has
begun to take shape in the form of Argentina’s ‘‘Net Party’’ (Partido de la Red)
which received 21,000 votes (1%) in the local parliamentary election in October
4 Data from a 2015 Pew research poll (Social Media Usage: 2005–2015) compared against data from the
United States Election Project (McDonald 2017).
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2013. Net Parties rely on social networking software in order to facilitate switching
between direct and indirect democracy. However, incorporating technology in this
way gives massive electorates the power to support a level of direct democracy that
would otherwise be impractical. To what extent will liquid democracies and Net
Parties affect our future elections?
The increasingly digital world supports a rapid flow of information which has the
potential to create a more informed electorate. A crucial side effect of this
informational freedom is that voters can select their preferred source of information.
In this way, it has become increasingly possible to only hear news reported by
sources that you already align with. Paradoxically, the advances in the flow of
information have coincided with information bubbles, echo chambers, and
widespread belief in ‘‘fake news’’ (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Technology will
undoubtedly continue to advance our inter-connectedness and availability to
information. How will a future democracy be affected by these advancements?
3.2 Globalization
Frey’s ‘‘basic idea of democracy is that people being affected by political decisions
have a say’’. In our highly-globalized society, it is patently clear that elections held
at the national level will almost always have international consequences. This is
most obvious when considering nations that have great war-fighting or economic
power. For example, the US presidential election and the UK’s Brexit vote will
certainly have implications outside of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Even the choices made by small countries have a global impact. The next social
leader or social despot can come from any nation. Small countries also have access
to goods that all living creatures enjoy such as clean oceans, clean air, and
endangered wildlife. If the purpose of a democratic election is to aggregate
preferences of people who will be affected by the election outcome, why should this
purpose not extend outside of physical boarders of a country? Should we allow for
impacted parties to cast votes, however small, in these domestic elections? Since the
major problems faced by any country are becoming increasingly global, our world
will need to transition from a landscape of competing nations to one where global
interests are of paramount importance. How will this increased inter-reliance be
reflected in our future democracy?
4 Conclusion
Today’s democracy ‘‘requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of
settings, from neighborhoods to nations to the world as a whole. Such a politics
requires citizens who can think and act as multiply-situated selves. The civic virtue
distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes
overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the
tension to which multiple loyalties give rise.’’ (Sandel 1998). A citizen’s role has
evolved over time. It will continue to evolve with advances in technology and our
growing reliance on one another. Can democracy be shaped into alignment with the
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evolving role of the citizen? If so, work following in the vein of Frey seems to be a
natural starting point.
Acknowledgements This paper greatly benefited from discussions and comments provided by Brittney
Kendall. The author also thanks the editors for comments on this manuscript.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
‘‘5 facts about same-sex marriage.’’ Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (June 26th, 2015). http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage/, Retrieved May 10th, 2017.
Agranov, M., & Ortoleva, P. (2017). Stochastic choice and preferences for randomization. Journal of
Political Economy, 125(1), 40–68.
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236.
Barker, E. (1958). Politics of Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bolton, G. E., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A. (2005). Fair procedures: evidence from games involving
lotteries. Economic Journal, 115(506), 1054–1076. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01032.x.
Borah, A. (2013). Other-regarding preferences, concerns for others’ opportunities and violations of
stochastic dominance: a choice-theoretic analysis. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2608933. Accessed
15 June 2017.
Cerreia-Vioglio, S., Dillenberger, D., Ortoleva, P., & Riella, G. (2015). Deliberately stochastic.
Unpublished paper (976).
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal of Political Economy,
65(2), 135–150.
Dwenger, N., Ku¨bler, D., & Weizsa¨cker, G. (2013). Preference for Randomization: Empirical and
Experimental Evidence. SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-004, Sonderforschungsbereich
649, Humboldt University, Berlin. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2192422.
Frey, B. S. (2017). Proposals for a democracy of the future. Homo Oeconomicus, 34(1), 1–9.
Gilens, M., & Page, Benjamin I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: elites, interest groups, and
average citizens. Perspectives on politics, 12(03), 564–581.
Halderman, J. A., & Teague, V. (2015). The new south wales ivote system: Security failures and
verification flaws in a live online election. International Conference on E-Voting and Identity.
Springer International Publishing, Berlin.
Holler, M. J., & Nurmi, H. (2013). Power, voting, and voting power: 30 years after. Berlin and
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Krawczyk, M., & Le Lec, F. (2010). ‘Give me a chance!’ an experiment in social decision under risk.
Experimental Economics, 13(4), 500–511. doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9253-5.
Machina, M. J. (1989). Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility models of choice under
uncertainty. Journal of Economic Literature, 27(4), 1622–1668.
McDonald, M. (2017). United States election project. http://www.electproject.org/2016g.html. Retrieved
June 15th, 2017.
Saari, Donald G. (2003). Unsettling aspects of voting theory. Economic Theory, 22(3), 529–555.
Sandel, M. J. (1998). Democracy’s discontent: America in search of a public philosophy. Cambridge:
Harvard University.
‘‘Social Media Usage: 2005–2015’’ Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (October 8th, 2015). http://
www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/, Retrieved June 15th, 2017.
Homo Oecon
123
Springall, D., Finkenauerm, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J., Hursti, H., MacAlpine, M., & Halderman, J. A.
(2014). Security analysis of the Estonian internet voting system. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York.
Vorenberg, M. (2001). Final freedom: The Civil War, the abolition of slavery, and the Thirteenth
Amendment. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective choice in the commons:
experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes. Economic Journal, 110(460), 212–234.
doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00497.
Homo Oecon
123
